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This Symposium Article examines how the public/private
divide works today and maps out some of the potential
implications for major issues in securities law. Classic debates
in securities law were often predicated on the idea that public
companies are a coherent class of firms that differ markedly
from private companies. For more than fifty years after the
adoption of the federal securities laws, this view was justified.
During that period, the vast majority of successful and
growing private firms eventually accepted the regulatory
obligations of being public in order to access a wider and
deeper pool of capital, among other benefits. This was a
descriptive reality, but it had important normative
implications as well. An identifiable class of large, growing
firms went public, and they generally went public for a reason
they shared: raising capital. As a result, regulatory
interventions imposed on the category of “public companies”
had a coherent target.
We argue that firms’ going public decisions are now shaped
by a much larger and more varied set of factors. These factors
are complex, cross-cutting, and impact firms considering going
public in very heterogeneous ways. This complexity results
from several developments and we emphasize two. First, it is a
result of the fact that while the public/private divide was
created by securities law, public and private markets now
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provide two widely different ecologies for firms, which
profoundly shape firms’ governance as well as the issuance and
trading of their shares. Second, long-term advances in the ease
of capital raising in private markets have made it possible for
firms to remain private indefinitely and have diminished or
eliminated the capital-raising advantages of public markets.
The result of this latter change has been rightly called a “new
equilibrium.” In that equilibrium, fewer and older firms go
public, while other successful firms remain private
indefinitely. In this equilibrium, capital raising is no longer
the primary reason firms go public. Rather, we argue, firms go
public due to one or more of the many other features of the
public market’s ecology.
The normative implication of this new equilibrium is to
reduce the coherency of the regulation of public companies. The
benefits and costs of being public (or private) apply unevenly
to firms eligible to go public. Instead, to a greater degree firms
now face idiosyncratic, company-specific tradeoffs between
being public or private, and they often go public for reasons
unrelated to the original design of the public/private divide.
Regulations imposed on public firms are likely to not only be
increasingly under- and over-inclusive, but also to apply to a
class of companies whose coherency as an economic
phenomenon may be increasingly suspect.
I.
II.
III.

IV.

Introduction ............................................................... 1201
Related Literature ..................................................... 1207
Securities Law Origins of the Public/Private Divide
..................................................................................... 1209
A. The Public/Private Divide for Operating
Companies ........................................................... 1210
B. The Public/Private Divide for Funds ................. 1213
1. Description ..................................................... 1213
2. Interactions and Overlap Between the
Company and Fund Divides ......................... 1215
3. An Idealized Public/Private Divide .............. 1218
Complexity: The Public/Private Divide Offers Two
Different Ecologies for Firms ................................... 1221

No. 3:1199]

V.
VI.

THE NEW PUBLIC/PRIVATE EQUILIBRIUM

1201

A. The Public/Private Divide Today: Functional
Complexity........................................................... 1221
1. Securities Law Rules that Turn Directly on
the Divide ....................................................... 1224
i. Governance Rules .................................... 1224
ii. Regulation Fair Disclosure (“Reg. FD”) . 1227
2. Devices that Turn on the Divide in Practice 1229
i. Control Over Shareholder Base ............. 1230
ii. Continuous Stock Prices ......................... 1230
iii. Informationally Rich Environment ........ 1231
iv. Aggregate Litigation ............................... 1232
3. Unbundling the Public/Private Divide ........ 1234
B. Capital Raising and Issuer Choice .................... 1236
C. Firms Now Face Complex, Idiosyncratic Tradeoffs
in Determining Whether to Be Public or Private
.............................................................................. 1238
Implications of the New Public/Private Equilibrium
..................................................................................... 1241
Conclusion .................................................................. 1243

I. INTRODUCTION
There may be no more profound issue facing securities
regulation than reimagining the public/private divide. The
divide is a centerpiece of securities law. It partitions
securities, offerings, and issuers into two halves, the private
and public, with each side subject to distinct privileges and
burdens.1 The issuance and trading of private companies’
1 Despite its defining role, for a long time, scholars failed to directly
analyze how the public/private divide worked and should work. In
extraordinarily prescient articles, Hillary Sale, Donald Langevoort, and
Robert Thompson observed the stresses that divide was encountering and
asked how it might be reimagined. See Hillary A. Sale, The New “Public”
Corporation, 74 LAW & CONTEMP . PROBS . 137, 138–41 (2011); Donald C.
Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary Securities
Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO . L.J. 337 (2013). See also Onnig H.
Dombalagian, Principles for Publicness, 67 FLA. L. REV. 649 (2016); Hillary
A. Sale & Robert B. Thompson, Market Intermediation, Publicness, and
Securities Class Actions, 93 WASH. U. L. R EV. 487, 538 (2015); Robert B.
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shares is restricted, but private firms’ regulation is otherwise
light, while public companies’ shares enjoy free issuance and
trading, but are subject to extensive mandatory disclosure.
Both public and private companies are of great consequence.
In the United States, the 6 million private firms and 3,600
public companies each account for roughly half of total sales,
pretax profits, and non-residential fixed investment.2 The
divide has existed since the beginning of federal securities
regulation, even as its details have shifted along the way.
So why rethink the divide? There are old and new
motivations. A familiar one centers on the perceived decline of
public firms. The number of U.S. public companies has fallen
from a peak of 8,025 in 1996 to 3,600 in 2020.3 Given that the
U.S. economy and global listings grew substantially during
that period, there is a case for a substantial “gap” in the
number of America’s public companies.4 This decline is often
Thompson & Donald C. Langevoort, Redrawing the Public-Private
Boundaries in Entrepreneurial Capital Raising, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1573,
1574, 1578–79 (2013). For an excellent overview of the securities law details
of the divide, see Edward F. Greene et al., The Need for a Comprehensive
Approach to Capital Markets Regulation, 2021 COLUM. BUS . L. REV. 714.
2 The number of private firms is taken from the Statistics of U.S.
Businesses. See 2018 SUSB Annual Data Tables by Establishment
Industry,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
census.gov/data/tables/2018/econ/susb/2018-susb-annual.html
(last
updated Oct. 8, 2021) (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review); see
also John Asker, Joan Farre-Mensa & Alexander Ljungqvist, Corporate
Investment and Stock Market Listing: A Puzzle?, 28 REV. FIN . S TUD . 342,
345 (2015). The number of public companies is taken from a recent Morgan
Stanley report. See MICHAEL J. MAUBOUSSIN & DAN CALLAHAN, MORGAN
STANLEY, PUBLIC TO PRIVATE EQUITY IN THE UNITED STATES: A LONG-TERM
LOOK
3
(2020),
https://www.morganstanley.com/im/publication/insights/articles/articles_p
ublictoprivateequityintheusalongtermlook_us.pdf [https://perma.cc/57BV42HL].
3 Craig Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi & René M. Stulz, The U.S. Listing
Gap, 123 J. FIN. ECON. 464, 464 (2017); Mauboussin & Callahan, supra note
2.
4 Doidge et al., supra note 3. It is highly controversial as to whether
this gap in nominal listings actually constitutes an economic problem. See,
e.g., B. Espen Eckbo & Markus Lithell, Merger-Driven Listing Dynamics 24,
26 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Fin. Working Paper No. 752/2021, 2021),
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attributed to increasing regulation imposed on public
companies, under the theory that firms need to access public
markets but cannot do so because of the high costs of being
public.5 A newer reason is that while the costs of being public
may have increased, as importantly, the costs of staying
private have decreased.6 In particular, private capital markets
have grown enormously. The traditional balance of capital
raising has reversed itself, with companies raising more funds
in private markets every year since 2009 and twice as much
in private markets than public markets in 2017.7 This growth
is not merely or fundamentally the story of a small number of
highly valued venture-backed firms. Rather, it is decades in
the making and affects the structure of the entire economy.8
Alongside these changes, developments in capital markets
during the last two decades have also made for an increasingly
hazy border between the private and public markets. Private
markets have grown increasingly complex and sophisticated.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3547581# (on file with
the Columbia Business Law Review) (arguing that the listing gap
disappears after accounting for M&A transactions involving public
acquirers, and suggesting that there is little evidence of a recent decline in
public firms’ contribution to the U.S. economy).
5 Doidge et al., supra note 3, at 465–66, is sometimes cited as refuting
the view that recent public company regulation materially deters IPOs
because it shows that the decline of IPOs precedes the adoption of new
regulation. See Michael Ewens & Joan Farre-Mensa, The Deregulation of
the Private Equity Markets and the Decline in IPOs, 33 REV. FIN. STUD. 5463,
5464 (2020) This interpretation is probably overstated, as recent evidence
suggests. See Michael Ewens, Kairong Xiao & Ting Xu, Regulatory Costs of
Being Public: Evidence from Bunching Estimation 3–5 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ.
Rsch.,
Working
Paper
No.
29143,
2021),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w29143 (on file with the Columbia Business
Law Review).
6 Elisabeth de Fontenay, The Deregulation of Private Capital and the
Decline of the Public Company, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 445, 448 (2017); Ewens &
Farre-Mensa, supra note 5, at 5463–64.
7 SCOTT BAUGUESS, RACHITA GULLAPALLI & VLADIMIR IVANOV, U.S. SEC.
& EXCH. COMM’N, CAPITAL RAISING IN THE U.S.: AN ANALYSIS OF THE MARKET
FOR UNREGISTERED SECURITIES OFFERINGS, 2009‐2017, at 7–9, 8 fig.1, 9 tbl.1
(2018).
8 Id. at 3–4.
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Mutual funds invest in mature private companies,9 secondary
markets for private company stock grow larger and more
liquid,10 and the size and social impact of some private firms
rivals that of major public companies.11 Public markets reflect
increasing pressure to permit governance paradigmatic of
late-stage private companies,12 as well as changing
technologies for going public, such as primary and secondary
direct listings or SPACs.13 Many of these trends are
longstanding, even as their magnitude has grown. And so
these reasons, old and new, motivate regulators, academics,
and market participants to question the public/private divide.
In this Symposium Article, we sketch one way in which we
believe the public/private divide should be rethought. In
particular, we argue that the calculus facing firms between
being public or private has grown more idiosyncratic, making
the concept of “public companies” a less coherent one. Classic
debates in securities law were often predicated on the idea
that public companies are a coherent class of firms that differ
markedly from private companies. Indeed, for more than fifty
years after the adoption of the federal securities laws, this
view was justified. During that period, the vast majority of
successful and growing private firms eventually accepted the

9 See, e.g., Sergey Chernenko, Josh Lerner & Yao Zeng, Mutual Funds
as Venture Capitalists? Evidence from Unicorns, 34 REV. FIN. STUD. 2388
(2021).
10 See, e.g., Darian M. Ibrahim, The New Exit in Venture Capital, 65
VAND. L. REV. 1, 3, 16 (2012).
11 See, e.g., Matt Levine, SoftBank Has a Bigger, Weirder Vision,
BLOOMBERG:
OP.
(May
3,
2019,
12:00
PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-05-03/softbank-has-abigger-weirder-vision [https://perma.cc/S447-WTY6].
12 See, e.g., Gabriel Rauterberg, The Separation of Voting and Control:
The Role of Contract in Corporate Governance, 38 YALE J. ON REG. 1124,
1129–31 (2021) (exploring the role of shareholder agreements in post-IPO
firms); Jordan Schoenfeld, Contracts Between Firms and Shareholders, 58
J. ACCT. RSCH. 383, 385–86 (2020) (exploring firm-shareholder contracting
in public companies).
13 See, e.g., A Current Guide to Direct Listings, GIBSON DUNN (Jan. 8,
2021), https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/a-currentguide-to-direct-listings-january-2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/DLE8-FBVD].
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regulatory obligations of being public in order to access a
wider and deeper pool of capital, among other benefits.14 This
was a descriptive reality, but it had important normative
implications as well. An identifiable class of large, growing
firms went public, and they generally went public for a reason
they shared: raising capital.15 As a result, regulatory
interventions imposed on the category of “public companies”
had a coherent target.
We argue that firms’ going public decisions are now shaped
by a much larger and more varied set of factors. These factors
are complex, cross-cutting, and impact firms considering
going public in very heterogeneous ways. This complexity
results from several developments, and we emphasize two.
First, it is a result of the fact that while the public/private
divide was created by securities law, public and private
markets now provide two widely different ecologies for firms,
which profoundly shape firms’ governance as well as the
issuance and trading of their shares. Second, as noted, longterm advances in the ease of capital raising in private markets
have diminished or eliminated the capital-raising advantages
of public markets. As Donald Langevoort predicted,16 this vast
growth in capital raising in private markets has made for an
“issuer choice”17 regime, in which large, successful private

de Fontenay, supra note 6.
Id.
16 Donald Langevoort, The Regulation of Primary Markets, in
SECURITIES MARKET ISSUES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 101, 122, 127 (Merritt Fox
et al. eds. 2018) (“[P]robably the most conceptually interesting subject in
securities law . . . is it possible—indeed desirable—that a large segment of
economically important firms in the American economy stay private,
perhaps indefinitely, yet with easy access to large amounts of capital?”).
17
“Issuer choice” refers the ability of issuers to decide under which
regulatory regime they fall. See Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory
Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85
VA. L. REV. 1335, 1337–39 (1999) (arguing against issuer choice); Paul G.
Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1093 (1995) (noting ways in which federal securities
regulation always offered some optionality as to regulatory environment).
This Article uses the term to describe the choice issuers have between
staying private or going public.
14
15
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firms can remain private indefinitely while still enjoying
growth. The result of this latter change has been rightly called
a “new equilibrium.”18 In that equilibrium, fewer and older
firms go public, and firms’ decisions between the public or
private ecologies is no longer principally driven by capital
raising.19 We argue that firms primarily go public due to one
or more of the many other features of the public market’s
ecology.
In developing this argument, we aim to synthesize a large
and sprawling literature that addresses the public/private
divide in order to show that it now consists of two complex and
multidimensional ecologies that differ along a host of different
economically important axes. Of course, capital raising was
never the sole determinant of firms’ going-public decisions—a
large literature spanning multiple markets and nations has
documented the many determinants of firms’ decisions to
cross the public/private divide.20 But with the astonishing
growth in capital raising in private markets, the remaining
determinants of firms’ decisions have become more varied and
idiosyncratic.
How the public/private divide works matters to the success
of the regulation of public and private companies. The
normative implication of this new equilibrium is to reduce the
coherency of the regulation of public companies. The benefits
and costs of being public (or private) no longer apply
consistently to firms eligible to go public (or remain private);
instead, to a greater degree firms now face idiosyncratic,
company-specific tradeoffs, and they often go public for
Ewens & Farre-Mensa, supra note 5, at 5498.
Id. at 5506.
20 Global evidence suggests that the principal determinants of firms’
decisions to go public vary enormously. See, e.g., Marco Pagano, Fabio
Panetta & Luigi Zingales, Why Do Companies Go Public? An Empirical
Analysis, 53 J. FIN. 27, 27–30 (1998) (finding that Italian firms go public to
alter their capital structure and benefit from misvaluation of their sector);
Michelle Lowry, Micah S. Officer & G. William Schwert, The Variability of
IPO Initial Returns, 65 J. FIN. 425, 463 (2010) (finding capital demands and
investor sentiment predict firms’ IPO decisions); Sreedhar T. Bharath &
Amy K. Dittmar, Why Do Firms Use Private Equity To Opt Out of Public
Markets?, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 1771, 1776–80 (2010) (collecting sources).
18
19
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reasons unrelated to the original design of the public/private
divide. Regulations imposed on public firms are likely to not
only be increasingly under- and over-inclusive, but also to
apply to a class of companies whose coherency as an economic
phenomenon seems increasingly fraught.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II briefly surveys
some of the relevant literature. Part III describes the legal
architecture of the public/private divide established by
securities law as well as the separate divide established by
investment fund regulation and emphasizes how the two
interact. It also notes how the growth of capital raising in
private markets has led to an issuer choice regime for large
private firms. Part IV explores the complexity and many
determinants of the widely distinct, if also overlapping,
ecologies of public and private markets. Alongside the
distinctions created and contemplated by legal design, a
number of other differences have grown more significant. Part
V considers some of the normative implications of these
changes. We then conclude.

II. RELATED LITERATURE
Given the public/private divide’s foundational role in
securities law, a large literature has developed around it—one
far too large to discuss comprehensively. But three facets of
that literature are especially relevant here. One facet
theorizes the public/private divide itself. Pioneered by Donald
Langevoort, Robert Thompson, and Hilary Sale, this
literature seeks to both rationalize and question the structure
of how the public and private are divided and the nature of
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the dividing line itself.21 Where should that line be drawn?22
And should it be one line between two fundamentally different
alternatives,23 several distinct regulatory classifications,24 or
a continuum of regulatory treatment?25
Another facet of the literature addresses the soundness of
the policy interventions imposed on those firms classified as
public or private. One of securities law’s core debates explored
the desirability of the mandatory disclosure regime that is the
centerpiece of the regulation of public issuers and offerings.26
21 See, e.g., Sale, supra note 1, 138–41; Langevoort & Thompson, supra
note 1; Sale & Thompson, supra note 1; see also Joan MacLeod
Heminway, Crowdfunding and the Public/Private Divide in U.S. Securities
Regulation, 83 U. CIN . L. R EV. 477, 481–84 (2014) (applying the framework
developed by Langevoort, Sale, and Thompson to crowdfunding); Jill E.
Fisch, The Mess at Morgan: Risk, Incentives and Shareholder
Empowerment, 83 U. CIN L. REV. 651, 654 (2015) (arguing that efforts to
deploy corporate governance to shape corporation’s social role are
misguided).
22 See, e.g., Michael D. Guttentag, Patching a Hole in the JOBS Act:
How and Why to Rewrite the Rules That Require Firms to Make Periodic
Disclosures, 88 IND. L.J. 151, 195–211 (2013) (proposing modifications to
federal periodic disclosure regime structure); A. C. Pritchard, Revisiting
“Truth in Securities” Revisited: Abolishing IPOs and Harnessing Private
Markets in the Public Good, 36 S EATTLE U. L. REV. 999, 1002 (2013)
(proposing to re-design the public/private divide with trading volume or
market capitalization triggering the transition between public and private
markets).
23 See, e.g., Usha R. Rodrigues, The Once and Future Irrelevancy of
Section 12(G), 2015 U. I LL . L. REV. 1529, 1561 (discussing trading volume
as a trigger for public status).
24 See, e.g., Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 1, at 342.
25 Jeff Schwartz, The Twilight of Equity Liquidity, 34 C ARDOZO L. R EV .
531, 579 (2012).
26 Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to
Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2373–80 (1998) (arguing that
mandatory disclosure rules do not contribute to investor welfare and that
corporate firms have other incentives to disclose information); Fox, supra
note 17, at 1340–42 (advocating for the present mandatory disclosure
regime); Merritt B. Fox, The Issuer Choice Debate, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES
L. 563, 568–571 (2001) (arguing against an issuer choice regime and for
mandatory disclosure laws) [hereinafter Fox, Issuer Choice]; John C. Coffee,
Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure
System, 70 V A. L. REV. 717, 721–23 (1984) (arguing for mandatory
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A generation later, progress has been made, but basic
questions remain as to the optimal design of a disclosure
regime, both in terms of whom it should apply to and its
content.27
A last and sprawling facet of the literature explores the
effects of differences in public and private markets on the
operation of firms.28 This literature addresses issues as varied
as the determinants of whether firms go public or not,29 and
the effects of being private or public on innovation, 30 issuer
malfeasance,31 and corporate time-horizons.32

III. SECURITIES LAW ORIGINS OF THE
PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE
In this Part, we describe the original securities law
distinctions at the heart of the public/private divide. Current
debates center on the legal distinction between public and
private operating companies, which we describe in Section
III.A. What is often missed in these debates, however, is that,
in practice, the public/private divide for operating companies
is also profoundly affected by the public/private divide for
investment funds, which we describe in Section III.B. Finally,
in Section III.C, we engage in a thought experiment,
imagining how an idealized version of the public/private

disclosure to promote market efficiency and suggesting an investor-oriented
mandatory disclosure system).
27 See Guttentag, supra note 22.
28 Asker et al., supra note 2, at 344–45 (finding that short-termism
distorts the investment decisions of public firms); Eric L. Talley, Public
Ownership, Firm Governance, and Litigation Risk, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 335,
336 (2009) (analyzing and empirically exploring how litigation risk might
affect firms’ going private decisions in comparison with governance
changes); Elizabeth Pollman, Private Company Lies, 109 GEO. L.J. 353, 359–
360 (2020) (exploring information asymmetry and securities fraud in the
context of private markets and proposing an enforcement regime).
29 Ewens et al., supra note 5, at 5–6.
30 See, e.g., Shai Bernstein, Does Going Public Affect Innovation?, 70 J.
FIN. 1365, 1365, 1367–68 (2015).
31 Pollman, supra note 28.
32 Asker et al., supra note 2, at 344.
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divide could work. That idealized picture will prove a useful
contrast to how we think the public/private divide actually
works today, which we explore in Parts IV and V.

A. The Public/Private Divide for Operating Companies
Although the public/private divide now pervasively
characterizes capital markets in the U.S., it originally began
as a legal distinction.33 That divide was first constructed and
mandated by the federal securities laws almost ninety years
ago, in the wake of the Great Depression. 34 Since the
public/private divide was established, both the lines of
demarcation and their consequences have periodically shifted.
Yet the regulatory divide itself persists, and it profoundly
shapes market activity.
Arguably, the best known of the public/private divides is
the distinction between public and private issuers.35 The

33 Indeed, the public/private divide established by the Securities Act of
1933 and the Exchange Act of 1934 (together, the “Securities Acts”) actually
encompasses a set of four distinctions between “public” and “private”: (1)
companies, (2) securities, (3) offerings of securities; and (4) trading markets.
These distinctions arise by operation of the Securities Act of 1933
(“Securities Act”), Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa), and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange
Act”), Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq), as well as the respective regulations thereunder. The
Exchange Act imposes disclosure and other requirements on a specific set
of companies (“public companies”), and the Securities Act requires
disclosure in connection with specific securities offerings (“public
offerings”). See The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investingbasics/role-sec/laws-govern-securities-industry
[https://perma.cc/JK6V74PJ] (last visited Oct. 15, 2021). Finally, the two statutes combine to create
two different securities trading environments (the “public” and “private”
markets). See de Fontenay, supra note 6, at 452–53.
34 de Fontenay, supra note 6, at 452–53; see also Paul G. Mahoney, The
Political Economy of the Securities Act of 1933, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2001)
(describing the origins of the federal securities laws).
35 As discussed infra in Section II.B., there is a separate regulatory
framework and public/private divide for companies that are investment
funds.
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Securities Act of 1933,36 together with the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934,37 sought to ensure that companies
whose securities were issued to or traded by the general public
disclosed sufficient information for investors to make good
decisions about whether, how much, and when to invest.38
There are three basic criteria or “triggers” for when an
operating company becomes “public” under the securities laws
and subject to the obligations of public status: (1) they offer to
sell their securities to the general public;39 (2) they grow large
enough that their assets or shareholders of record exceed
specified thresholds;40 or (3) at least one class of their
securities is traded on a national securities exchange.41 We
loosely refer to companies subject to these disclosure burdens
as “public” companies. In this sense, these three triggers
define the public/private divide.
The centerpiece of the obligations imposed on public
companies by the Securities Acts is a mandatory disclosure
system.42 The disclosure obligations of public companies are
substantial. Public firms must provide not only financial
statements, but also detailed information about governance,

36 Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act), Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa).
37 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), Pub. L. No. 73-291,
48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq).
38 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A Behavioral
Analysis, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023, 1023 (“Congress intended the securities
laws to ‘substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat
emptor[.]’”).
39 See Securities Act § 77e(c) (prohibiting the sale of any security unless
a registration statement is effective); id. § 77d(2) (declaring that the
prohibition does not apply to “transactions by an issuer not involving any
public offering”).
40 Section 12(g) of the Exchange Act, as amended by the JOBS Act,
requires a company to register its securities under the Exchange Act if it
has ten million dollars or more in total assets and a class of equity securities
“held of record” by 2000 or more persons (or 500 or more persons who are
not “accredited investors”). See Exchange Act § 78l(g)(1)(A).
41 See id. § 78l(d).
42 See Bainbridge, supra note 38, at 1023–24 (“Mandatory disclosure is
a—if not the—defining characteristic of U.S. securities regulation.”).
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operations, and risks to investors.43 Public company
disclosure is required both upon the occurrence of notable
events in the company’s life (including securities issuances,
entry into transactions and other materials contracts, and
major governance changes) and on a periodic basis (including
every quarter and prior to every annual shareholders’
meeting).44 The disclosure and associated regulatory burdens
on public companies are significant, and the aggregate out-ofpocket costs of being a public company have been estimated at
an additional $2.5 million per year.45 For the most part,
“private” companies avoid all public disclosure requirements
under the federal securities laws.46 Given that the disclosure
and other securities law burdens on public companies have
increased significantly over time, while private company
burdens have long remained a null set,47 the public/private
divide has become only sharper since its inception—at least,
when it is conceived of solely as a legal distinction.
At the same time, the composition of public and private
companies has shifted, with the number of public companies
in the U.S. economy shrinking significantly over the past
twenty-five years.48 The average public company today is
43 These disclosure requirements are found in Sections 12 and 13 of the
Exchange Act and the SEC rules that implement it. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78l,
78m (2018); 17 C.F.R. § 229.301 (2021).
44 See 15 U.S.C. § 78m.
45 See Alix Stuart, The True Costs of Being Public: More Than You
Think, CFO (Nov. 18, 2011) https://www.cfo.com/credit-capital/2011/11/the[https://perma.cc/A4RK-QUVG]
true-costs-of-being-public-more-than-you-think/
(reporting on the results of a survey by Ernst & Young). Note that the $2.5
million in additional costs also includes items that are not directly related
to compliance with the securities laws, such as $1.5 million in added costs
of attracting and retaining management and board members. See id.
46 Zoeanna
Mayhook, Privately-Held Companies: Legislation,
Regulation, and Limited Dissemination of Financial Information, 47 DTTP
28, 28 (2019).
47 Id. at 28–32 (detailing changes in federal disclosure requirements
over time).
48 See supra notes 3–4; Xiaohui Gao, Jay R. Ritter & Zhongyan Zhu,
Where Have All the IPOs Gone?, 48 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1663
(2013) (documenting and explaining the long-term decline in initial public
offerings by U.S. firms).
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considerably older and larger in terms of market
capitalization than it was three decades ago, and, overall, the
number of public companies has shrunk relative to the
number of private companies.49 The plausible explanations for
this development are many and varied, as both sides of the
public/private company divide have experienced major
changes in recent decades. Most notably, (1) public-company
disclosure and other regulatory burdens have increased; (2)
capital raising by private firms has grown significantly;50 and
(3) the requirements for when private companies must become
public companies have been materially loosened.51

B. The Public/Private Divide for Funds
1. Description
As they exist today, public and private markets are a
product not only of the public/private divide for companies, but
also of the distinct public/private divide for funds. This
Section describes the public/private divide that investment
fund regulation creates for funds and how it interacts with the
public/private divide created by securities law. The
interaction of these two bodies of securities law plays a key
role in explaining (1) which companies tend to fall on each side
of the divide, (2) how companies behave on each side,
including how they are governed and financed, (3) what

49 MICHAEL J. MAUBOUSSIN, DAN CALLAHAN & DARIUS MAJD, CREDIT
SUISSE, THE INCREDIBLE SHRINKING UNIVERSE OF STOCKS: THE CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES OF FEWER U.S. EQUITIES, 2 exhibit 1 (2017),
https://www.cmgwealth.com/wpcontent/uploads/2017/03/document_1072753661.pdf?mod=article_inline
[https://perma.cc/8LQK-DJ8M] (showing the increase in age and market
capitalization and the decrease in number of U.S. listed companies).
50 de Fontenay, supra note 6.
51 See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126
Stat. 306 (2012) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 78l(g)(1)) (modifying
Section 12(g)(1) of the Exchange Act to increase the number of shareholders
of record beyond which a firm must register under the Exchange Act from
500 to 2,000).
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information is available about these companies, and (4) how
their securities are traded.
Investment funds (or simply “funds”) are pools of capital,
typically raised from many institutional or individual
investors, which are then used to make investments at the
direction of the fund’s investment manager(s).52 Mutual
funds, exchange-traded funds (“ETFs”), real estate
investment trusts (“REITs”), hedge funds, private equity
funds, and venture capital funds are all different types of
investment funds.53 These funds are typically distinguished
based on what types of assets they invest in and whom they
admit as investors.54 In recent decades, as banks and other
financial institutions have declined in importance, investment
funds have assumed a dominant role in providing capital to
both public and private companies. It is estimated, for
example, that approximately 80% of the stock of U.S. public
companies is held by institutional investors, most of which are
investment funds.55 Investment funds have become so
dominant in U.S. corporate finance and financial markets
generally that our age has been described as “the empire of
the fund.”56

52 See John Morley, The Separation of Funds and Managers: A Theory
of Investment Fund Structure and Regulation, 123 YALE L.J. 1228, 1232.
53 Id. at 1231, 1234–36.
54 WILLIAM A. BIRDTHISTLE, EMPIRE OF THE FUND: THE WAY WE SAVE
NOW 6 (2016).
55 See 80% of Equity Market Cap Held by Institutions, PENSIONS & INVS.
(Apr.
25,
201,
1:00
AM),
https://www.pionline.com/article/20170425/INTERACTIVE/170429926/80of-equity-market-cap-held-by-institutions [https://perma.cc/CRQ2-KR7B]; see also
John C. Coates, IV, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I: The Problem
of Twelve 13 (Harv. Pub. Law Working Paper No. 19-07, 2018),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3247337 (on file with the Columbia Business Law
Review) (estimating that 20-30% of the stock of U.S. public companies is
owned solely by indexed funds—that is, funds that passively track a
specified market index—and noting that three indexed fund providers
(Vanguard, State Street, and BlackRock) on their own controlled
approximately 15% of the stock of companies in the S&P 500 in 2017).
56 See BIRDTHISTLE, supra note 54.
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Operating companies and investment funds are subject to
distinct securities laws, and each body of law constructs a
different public/private divide.57 Funds are governed by the
Investment Company Act of 1940 (“ICA”), which defines their
divide.58 Similar to the framework for operating companies,
funds on the public side—commonly known as “registered”
funds—are permitted to raise capital from virtually anyone,
including retail investors, and are subject to extensive
disclosure requirements under the ICA.59 Private investment
funds, by contrast, may generally raise capital only from large
institutional investors or from a very limited number of
investors,60 and they face extremely limited disclosure
obligations.61

2. Interactions and Overlap Between the

57 See John Morley, Why Do Investment Funds Have Special Securities
Regulation?, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK OF MUTUAL FUNDS 9, 9 (William A.
Birdthistle & John Morley eds. 2018). That funds are governed by their own
securities law, and have their own public/private divide, are foundational
issues, but until recently they were largely overlooked by the scholarly
literature. For leading work on these issues, see id. 9–21; see also Allen
Ferrell & John D. Morley, The Regulation of Intermediaries, in SECURITIES
MARKET ISSUES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 16, at 313, which also
provides an elegant overview of current fund regulation and open questions
regarding it.
58 Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §80a-6(c) (2018).
59 Morley, supra note 57, at 13–14.
60 Specifically, the ICA exempts from public registration those funds
whose investors are all “qualified purchasers” or funds with fewer than 101
investors. Investment Company Act § 80a-3(c)(1)–(c)(7) (exempting issuers
from “investment company” status if the issuer’s securities are owned by
100 persons (or fewer) or if all securities are held by qualified purchasers);
17 C.F.R. § 270.2a51-1(h) (2021) (defining “qualified purchaser”).
61 Private
Equity
Funds,
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investingbasics/investment-products/private-investment-funds/private-equity
[https://perma.cc/GBY2-JQLU] (last visited Oct. 16, 2021).
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Company and Fund Divides
It is worth considering the regulatory framework for funds
in greater detail, as it ultimately shapes in what they invest.62
Consider first the investment restrictions imposed on public
funds such as mutual funds and ETFs. Public funds’
investment portfolios are subject to strict diversification and
liquidity requirements.63 Public funds wishing to invest in
corporate securities must therefore invest almost exclusively
in those that can be bought and sold in a large, continuous
trading market. In practice, as we shall see, those will tend to
be the equity and debt securities of public companies.
Private funds, by contrast, face no such constraints on
their investment portfolios, and therefore do not require the
near-perfect liquidity and easy diversification of a securities
market with an enormous volume of trading. To the contrary,
they are at liberty to make a very small number of highly
illiquid investments.64 The purpose of leveraged buyout funds,
for example, is to acquire controlling stakes in companies as
62 Beyond the disclosure obligations described above, public funds face
significant constraints on their investment portfolios, their governance, and
their compensation models, none of which are imposed on private funds.
Among other things, the ICA requires public funds (1) to constrain leverage,
(2) avoid incentive compensation, and (3) provide frequent redemptions. On
the first point, the ICA only permits open-end mutual funds to become
indebted to banks, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(f)(1)); prohibits issuing debt
securities, id. 80a-18(a)); and requires that total assets must always equal
or exceed bank loan principal by a ratio of 3 to 1, id. 80a-18(f)(1)). On the
second point, Provisions of the Investment Advisers Act (“IAA”) only permit
adviser performance fees if the fee is symmetric with poor performance
punished to the same extent good performance is rewarded, and
performance is based on a benchmark. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15
U.S.C. § 80b-5(b)(2) (2018). The ICA prohibits mutual funds from issuing
shares for services. Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. §80a-22(g). Finally,
on the third point, see Sections 2(a)(32) (defining redeemable security as a
security whose holder, upon presenting it to the issuer, is entitled its
proportionate share of net assets) and 22(e) of the Investment Company Act
(constraining the suspension of registration rights). Investment Company
Act §§ 80a-2(a)(32), 22(e).
63 See I.R.C. §§ 851, 852 (2018).
64 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE
FUNDS 7 (2003)
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their sole investments over such funds’ typical ten-year life
span.65
All this explains in part why public funds such as mutual
funds and ETFs invest overwhelmingly in public companies
with exchange-traded stock,66 while private funds such as
private equity, leveraged buyout funds, and venture capital
funds make highly illiquid investments in private
companies.67 This, then, is the fundamental way in which the
public/private divide for funds interacts with and shapes the
public/private divide for operating companies—by structurally
biasing the universe of prospective shareholders for
companies on each side of the public/private divide. Public
companies will be financed primarily by public funds, while
private operating companies will be financed primarily by
private funds.
To be clear, there is no securities law restriction
whatsoever on private funds investing in public companies,
and there is no direct prohibition on public funds investing in
private companies—the legal constraints on public funds
operate indirectly through the diversification and liquidity
requirements, as we have seen. Although hedge funds are set
up as private funds, their equity investments are
overwhelmingly in public company stocks,68 while some openend mutual funds have recently made major investments in
large private companies.69 Yet by dollar volume, the
overwhelming preponderance of investment by private funds
is in private companies and by public funds in public
65 See Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Leveraged Buyouts and
Private Equity, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 121, 123 (2009).
66 See Concept Release on Harmonization of Securities Offering
Exemptions, Securities Act Release No. 10,649, Exchange Act Release No.
86,129, Investment Company Release No. 33,512, 84 Fed. Reg. 30,460,
30,515 (proposed June 26, 2019) (noting that “registered investment
companies” such as mutual funds and ETFs are limited in their ability to
invest in private companies).
67 See Ann-Kristin Achleitner & Christoph Kaserer, Private Equity
Funds and Hedge Funds: A Primer 9, 11 (Ctr. For Entrepreneurial & Fin.
Studs., Working Paper 2005-03, 2005).
68 See id.
69 Chernenko et al., supra note 9, at 2370.
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companies.70 The two divides both interact and overlap. It
would not matter if registered funds invested overwhelmingly
in public companies and private funds in private companies,
if those funds did not fundamentally differ in how they
affected the companies they own. But, as we will argue in Part
III, they do.

3. An Idealized Public/Private Divide
To grasp how the public/private divide actually works, it is
illuminating to contrast it with an idealized, simple version of
how a public/private divide could in principle work. In this
simple version, few regulatory requirements are imposed on
private companies beyond the anti-fraud rule, while an
extensive disclosure regime is imposed on public companies.
However, private firms are severely restricted in their ability
to raise capital from third parties. Public firms, by contrast,
may sell their securities to anyone, and thus can access a
substantially cheaper and deeper pool of capital than private
firms.71 In this simple framework, firms are founded and
70 Why do private funds typically invest in private companies and
public funds in public companies? Registered funds must offer daily
redemption. A registered fund that invested in illiquid securities would be
exposed to a run. See Holger Spamann, Indirect Investor Protection: The
Investment Ecosystem and Its Legal Underpinnings 27 (Eur. Corp.
Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 594/2021, 2021),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3707249 (on file with
the Columbia Business Law Review); see also 17 C.F.R. § 270.22e-4(b)(1)(iv)
(2021) (restricting open-end mutual funds from holding more than 15% of
their portfolio in assets without an available quotation). Conversely, a fund
structured to specialize in investing in illiquid securities would choose not
to be a registered fund. SIMPSON THACHER, REGISTERED FUNDS ALERT 6–7
(2020),
stblaw.com/docs/defaultsource/Publications/registeredfundsalert_september2020.pdf (on file with
the Columbia Business Law Review) (discussing lack of registered funds’
investment in illiquid private corporate equities).
71 Historically,
[c]ompanies that went public took on the obligation of
publicly disclosing substantial amounts of information
and, in return, were permitted to solicit the largest (and
therefore cheapest) source of capital: the general public.
Conversely, private companies were restricted to raising
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begin operating as private companies. Some of those firms fail,
others succeed moderately, and all of those firms can and do
remain private. Highly successful, large private firms,
however, almost inevitably require access to the broader
world of capital available in public markets. Thus, they almost
invariably go public.
In this idealized version, a firm’s decision to cross the
public/private divide is a near-mechanical result of that firm
growing to a certain size and needing to meet its
accompanying capital-raising needs. Successful firms facing
the decision between going public and staying private do
encounter a tradeoff, which is that being public offers cheaper
capital but higher regulatory costs. That tradeoff is relatively
simple to evaluate, however, and it applies fairly uniformly
across the broad set of private firms successful enough to
contemplate going public.72
This vision is worth considering because it shows how the
answers to foundational questions about the public/private
divide might change with time. Consider three basic questions
about the public/private divide: (1) How does the divide work?
(2) How does the tradeoff facing firms work? (3) How should
we judge the divide’s success?
We have already described how the divide works in this
simple model as well as the effects of the tradeoff facing firms
determining whether to be public or private. The divide
creates a set of capital-raising benefits and costly regulatory
mandates that arise as a kind of rite of passage for successful
firms. The tradeoff is a calculation that pits these costs and
benefits against each other in a fairly uniform way for firms.
capital primarily from insiders and financial institutions,
without publicity and subject to severe limitations on
subsequent transfers of their securities⎯effectively
precluding any sort of market for private company equity.
de Fontenay, supra note 6.
72 Our contention is not that the regulatory costs and capital-raising
benefits of being public would apply in the same way to firms. Regulatory
costs are more likely to be largely fixed, Ewens, supra note 5, while the
benefits of capital raising are more likely to scale with the size of a firm.
Rather, it is that the factors important to this tradeoff are the same for IPOeligible companies.
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What constitutes success for this divide? Presumably, this
public/private divide is a success if the mandatory regulations
imposed on public firms appropriately mitigate market
failures made more probable (or significant) when a firm is
public.73 Therefore, such regulations should target market
failures likely to accompany firms with a broad and diffuse
shareholder base, such as managerial agency costs stemming
from collective action problems among shareholders.74
This view of how the public/private equilibrium works is a
positive theory, dedicated to describing and explaining firm
behavior. But it has clear normative implications as well.
Because an identifiable class of firms will go public for the
same basic reason, regulatory interventions targeting public
firms have a coherent target.
In the next Part, we argue that a much broader set of legal,
economic, and social factors have developed downstream from
the public/private divide that securities law established in the
1930s. The result is two broadly distinct public and private
ecologies. These two ecologies differ along a large number of
economically consequential dimensions that are materially
important to the decisions firms make about being public or
private as well as any social welfare analysis of the
consequences of those decisions. Even as these ecologies have
developed, moreover, the original driving force for going
public—capital raising—has materially diminished. 75 As
noted, considerably more capital is now raised in exempt than
registered offerings.76 As a result, firms no longer share one
leading reason for going public. Instead, we argue that the
factors that are now material to firms’ decisions are many,
complex, and often cross-cutting. The cumulative effect is that
73 It is not our contention that the world was ever so simple or that
securities scholars or regulators took it to be. Instead, we think this simple
picture offers a useful contrast. We will argue that the public/private divide
works today as a vastly complex and varied set of institutions, many of
which are more important to firms’ decisions than the legal rules that define
the public/private divide and its obligations.
74 Asker et al., supra note 2, at 355.
75 de Fontenay, supra note 6, at 448.
76 BAUGUESS ET AL, supra note 7.

No. 3:1199]

THE NEW PUBLIC/PRIVATE EQUILIBRIUM

1221

IPO-eligible firms do not encounter one going public versus
staying private tradeoff, but many, firm-specific tradeoffs.
We begin by describing the complex and multi-dimensional
character of today’s public and private ecologies, drawing
extensively on prior work discussing one or more of these
dimensions. This sets the stage for discussing how features of
these ecologies shape different firms’ private/public decisions.

IV. COMPLEXITY: THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE
DIVIDE OFFERS TWO DIFFERENT ECOLOGIES
FOR FIRMS
In this Part, we describe the complexity of the
public/private ecosystems today. The complexity results from
the interaction of many different features of markets,
including corporate governance, securities markets, and
investment management regulation. This interaction, and the
accretion of decades of practices and institutional features,
suggest that despite its prominence, it is not at all clear how
the public/private divide today actually works.

A. The Public/Private Divide Today: Functional
Complexity
As the securities laws designed it, the public/private divide
is a set of criteria that defines the divide and a set of different
burdens and privileges that accompany falling on one side or
the other. In this Section, we discuss the many economically
and socially consequential features of capital markets that
seem to also turn on the divide. In the face of these many
features, it becomes plausible that the public/private divide is
no longer principally a matter of the features initially
designed by securities law. While the Securities Acts created
the public/private divide almost nine decades ago,77 it has
become much more than originally envisioned. The
public/private divide of today is best conceptualized as a hazy

77

Supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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division between two different ecologies—complex systems
characterized by complicated interactions.78
Below we describe—and attempt to explain—some of the
most salient features of the private and the public ecologies,
and how they interact. First, we discuss key rules and
regulations that turn directly on the divide established by
securities law. Second, we describe features that turn on the
public/private divide in practice but that are not directly
entailed by any legal requirements; they are downstream of
law. Table 1 summarizes these differences.

Table 1: Key Differences Between Average Public and
Private Companies
PUBLIC
COMPANIES
Distinctions
imposed by
law

PRIVATE
COMPANIES

Mandatory
Disclosure
Rules

Substantial periodic
and episodic
disclosure79

No mandatory
disclosure80

Governance
Rules

Extensive regulation
of (1) shareholder
voting, (2) tender
offers, (3) internal
financial controls, (4)
board composition,
and (5) disclosure
and process
surrounding
executive
compensation81

No comparable
requirements
under state law82

78 For a compelling example of ecological analysis of public markers, see
Spamann, supra note 70.
79 See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
80 See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
81 See infra Section IV.A.1.a.
82 See infra Section IV.A.1.a.
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Reg. FD

Prohibition on
selective disclosure
by companies83

Selective
disclosure
permitted84

Ownership
(shareholder
base)

Dispersed, mostly
passive shareholder
base85

Small shareholder
base, selected by
insiders and
composed
primarily of active
investors86

Trading
environment

Continuous stock
prices87

Little or no
trading; valuation
occurs only upon
major corporate
events (capital
raising,
acquisition, etc.) 89

Market approaches
informational
efficiency88
Information
environment

83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
92
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Very rich set of
regularly updated,
publicly available
information, as a
result of (i)
mandatory
disclosure, (ii)
analyst reports,
media, and other
market research,
and (iii) stock

See infra notes 115–118 and accompanying text.
See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
See id.
See infra note 126 and accompanying text.
See infra Section IV.A.1.b.
See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
See infra Section IV.A.1.b.
See infra Section IV.A.2.c.

Market is not
informationally
efficient 90
Very limited
information, not
only for the
general public but
also for investors92
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prices91
Governance

Centralized,
professional
management by a
board of directors
appointed each year
by shareholders and
including several
independent
directors93

Management
mostly by largest
shareholders;
governance and
control rights
established in
connection with
major corporate
transactions,
rather than on a
yearly basis 94

Regulation
and
Enforcement

Aggregate
shareholder
litigation (e.g., class
actions) common95

Relatively little
shareholder
litigation 96

1. Securities Law Rules that Turn Directly on the
Divide
Securities law’s public/private divide was designed to
impose disclosure obligations on public issuers. We begin by
discussing the range of other rules that now also turn directly
on securities law’s public/private divide.

i. Governance Rules
Traditionally, corporate governance has been a matter of
state law.97 Under the “internal affairs doctrine,” the law of a
See infra Section IV.A.2.c.
See Del. Code. Ann. tit. 8, § 141 (2021)
94 See Rauterberg, supra note 12, at 1133–36 (describing how
shareholder agreements often determine control of private firms).
91
93

See infra Section IV.A.2.d.
See infra Section IV.A.2.d.
97 Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Creeping Federalization of Corporate
Law, REGUL., Spring 2003, at 26, 26 (“For over 200 years, corporate
governance has been a matter for state law.”).
95
96
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firm’s state of incorporation governs the relationships among
the firm, its directors and officers, and its shareholders.98 As
a result, matters such as shareholder voting, board action, and
fiduciary duties are governed by state corporate statutes and
common law.99 For public companies, however, federal law
has progressively layered over a partly superseding corporate
governance regime by way of amendments to the securities
laws.100 This includes: (1) an extensive regulatory regime
governing almost every aspect of shareholder voting (referred
to as the “federal proxy rules”), (2) rules governing a
prominent form of acquisition (the tender offer),101 (3)
requirements of internal financial controls and certification,
(4) board composition requirements, and (5) executive
compensation reforms.102 This “federalization” of corporate
governance has accelerated over the last two decades,
primarily in response to major scandals or crises involving
public companies.103

98 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS §§ 302 cmt. a
(1971); see also Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975).
99 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS §§ 302 cmt. a, 303–309
(1971).
100 For an analysis of federal incursions into corporate governance, see
Eric L. Talley, Corporate Inversions and the Unbundling of Regulatory
Competition, 101 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1694–97 (2015).
101 Aspects of federal tender offer regulation do apply to tender offers
in private markets. See Dawn Belt, Pre-IPO Liquidity for Late Stage StartUps,
LEXIS
PRACTICE
ADVISOR
(2020),
https://assets.fenwick.com/legacy/FenwickDocuments/Pre-IPO-Liquidityfor-Late-Stage-Start-Up.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XN5-MW4P].
102 For a detailed description of these provisions, see Talley, supra note
100.
103 See id. at 1693 (arguing that the separation between corporate and
securities law “began disintegrating substantially after the bursting of the
dot-com bubble”). The extent of this displacement is controversial. For
instance, fiduciaries duties—perhaps the heart of corporate law—remain
largely if not wholly a creature of state law. See Roberta Romano, The
Market for Corporate Law Redux 47, 60, (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Law
Working
Paper
No.
270/2014,
2014),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2514650 (on file with
the Columbia Business Law Review).
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As a result, two similar corporations, one public and the
other private, will be subject to very different corporate
governance mandates. Because Delaware is the dominant
state for incorporations,104 it is useful to compare its
requirements to the federal regime for public companies.
Federal law now requires that public companies provide
substantial mandatory disclosure to shareholders around
voting, shareholder proxy access, independent board and
board committee members, and ex ante controls and
compliance to prevent misconduct, alongside ex post
enforcement.105
In contrast, Delaware law has remained largely silent on
each of these matters, allowing private companies to gravitate
toward the opposite pole, if they wish. Private companies can
largely forgo disclosure to their shareholders, whether in
connection with shareholder votes or otherwise: Their only
mandatory obligation is to respond to certain specific
shareholder requests for information.106 Second, regulation of
the substance and process of takeovers is left to the common
law, which tends to steer clear of bright-line rules in this
context.107 Third, private companies, including those financed
by private equity or venture capital funds, can have boards
composed solely of insiders and sometimes do. 108 Finally,

104 William J. Carney, George B. Shepherd & Joanna Shepherd Bailey,
Lawyers, Ignorance, and the Dominance of Delaware Corporate Law, 2
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 124, 126 (2012).
105 See JAMES D. COX, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS
597–98, 601–02, 956, 959 (7th ed. 2013) (discussing each of these features
of public-company regulation under the federal securities laws).
106 See Del. Code. Ann. tit. 8, § 220 (2021) (delineating shareholders’
rights to inspect the corporation’s “books and records”). Even then,
shareholders must first demonstrate that they have a proper purpose for
requesting the information (other than for the stockholder list). See id. §
220(b).
107 See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Delaware’s Retreat:
Exploring Developing Fissures and Tectonic Shifts in Delaware Corporate
Law, 42 DEL. J. CORP. L. 323, 324–26 (2018) (describing the role of the
Delaware courts in mergers and acquisitions law).
108 Michael Ewens & Nadya Malenko, Board Dynamics over the Startup
Life Cycle 32, 46 tbl.2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No.
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Delaware’s corporate statute simply does not address internal
controls. This leaves fraud or misconduct in private companies
to be dealt with ex post and indirectly through shareholder
lawsuits alleging breach of directors’ and officers’ fiduciary
duties to the corporation.109

ii. Regulation Fair Disclosure (“Reg. FD”)
For public companies whose stock is traded in a liquid
market, new information about the firm rapidly affects its
stock price as market actors incorporate the information into
their trading.110 If material information moves stock prices, it
signals that the market is working well: In an informationally
efficient market, a company’s stock price should reflect all
available information about the firm.111 Yet, such efficiency
also creates a profit opportunity for those who acquire
material information about the company before the rest of the
market.112 Concerns about the potential inefficiency or
unfairness of such profit opportunities have led to prohibitions
on insider trading.113
But what happens when companies voluntarily disclose
material nonpublic information selectively to specific market
actors, because they believe that doing so will benefit the
27769, 2020), http://www.nber.org/papers/w27769 (on file with the
Columbia Business Law Review).
109 See Donald C. Langevoort, Caremark and Compliance: A TwentyYear Lookback, 90 TEMP. L. REV. 727, 734 (2018) (describing how the
Delaware common law has shaped corporate compliance).
110 See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of
Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 565–67 (1984).
111 Id. at 554–57
112 Id. at 554, 556.
113 Insider trading consists of trading on the basis of material nonpublic
information in violation of a relationship of trust and confidence, whether
by (1) corporate insiders (such as directors, officers, and large stockholders),
(2) tippees of corporate insiders who were given the information in a quid
pro quo, and (3) anyone who misappropriated the information in breach of
a duty to whomever was in possession of that information and their tippees.
See Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten & Gabriel V. Rauterberg, Informed
Trading and Its Regulation, 43 J. CORP. L. 817, 863–68 (2018) (Overviewing
the regulation of insider trading).
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company? Corporate management routinely meets privately
with corporate analysts and large shareholders. It is almost
inevitable that these meetings will involve management
sharing information or insights that are not yet public, and
which may sometimes be material. This was a long-accepted
practice in corporate America.114
In exchange for this access to management, corporate
analysts might produce more favorable reports on the
company, and large shareholders might be more supportive of
management’s plans or provide useful guidance to
management.115 Despite these perceived benefits to the
corporation, the SEC ultimately determined that much
selective disclosure should be prohibited. In 2000, the SEC
adopted Regulation Fair Disclosure (“Reg. FD”), which
prevents selective disclosure of corporate information.116
Under Reg. FD, if a public company has material information
that it discloses to a particular broker-dealer, investment
fund, or investment adviser, it must instead disclose that
information to everyone (with some exceptions).117 Selective
disclosure of material nonpublic information to any
shareholder is also generally prohibited if it occurs “under
circumstances in which it is reasonably foreseeable that the

114 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release
No. 7881, Exchange Act Release No. 43,154, Investment Company Act
Release No. 24,599, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,715, 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R pts. 240, 243, 249) (stating in the final rulemaking for
Reg. FD that “many issuers [were] disclosing important nonpublic
information, such as advance warnings of earnings results, to securities
analysts or selected institutional investors or both, before making full
disclosure of the same information to the general public”).
115 Id. at 51,716–17.
116 See Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100–103 (2021).
117 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,735.
For an insightful argument of the consequences of Reg. FD for private and
public companies’ management of their cash holdings, see Joan FarreMensa, The Benefits of Selective Disclosure: Evidence from Private Firms
(Harv.
Bus.
Sch.
Working
Paper
No.
15-095,
2017),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1719204 (on file with the Columbia Business Law
Review).

No. 3:1199]

THE NEW PUBLIC/PRIVATE EQUILIBRIUM

1229

person will purchase or sell the issuer’s securities on the basis
of the information.”118
Once again, the contrast with private companies is
striking. There is no prohibition whatsoever under state or
federal law on selective disclosure by private companies. In
fact, selective disclosure of material information is the
norm.119 Take a venture capital-financed private company, for
example. Venture capital funds typically negotiate for the
contractual right to obtain certain disclosures from the
company and will often receive more information than is
contractually required.120 Further, fund investors in startups
are often entitled to designate one or more directors to the
corporate board,121 in which case the fund will enjoy a steady
stream of access to nonpublic information from the firm. Yet
other shareholders of the company, such as employees
compensated with restricted stock or options, may receive no
disclosure whatsoever.122

2. Devices that Turn on the Divide in Practice
Some of the most important features of the public and
private company ecologies are not directly imposed by law.
Rather, they reflect practices that are indirectly a
consequence of the legal architecture of the public/private
divide. Nonetheless, these features now represent some of the
most fundamental differences between public and private
companies observed in practice, including differences in (i)
ownership, (ii) governance, (iii) the informational
17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a)(2)(iv).
Farre-Mensa, supra note 117, at 1, 3.
120 Model Legal Documents NAT’L VENTURE CAP. ASS’N (“Information
and Observer Rights”), http://nvca.org/resources/model-legal-documents/
(on file with the Columbia Business Law Review) (select “Investors’ Rights
Agreement (Updated August 2021)”).
121 Brian J. Broughman & Jesse M. Fried, Carrots and Sticks: How VCs
Induce Entrepreneurial Teams to Sell Startups, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1319,
1329–30 (2012).
122 See Pollman, supra note 28, at 374 (2020) (discussing the paucity of
information disclosure required under the securities laws for employees
receiving equity compensation in private companies).
118
119
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environment, (iv) trading, and (v) regulation and enforcement.
We discuss these differences below.
As with any ecology, however, the relationships among the
various organisms (or “stakeholders,” in our context) are
generally reciprocal and circular. Because all five features
listed above interact with each other, it is difficult to discuss
them in isolation. As a result, we also describe some—though
by no means all—of the ways in which they are connected to
one another.

i. Control Over Shareholder Base
For companies that choose to take on the disclosure
requirements and other obligations tied to going public, one
countervailing benefit is public companies’ ability to raise
capital from anyone and to have their securities traded on a
national securities exchange. In practice, then, a public
company will tend to have a more dispersed and diverse
shareholder base.123 Further, the company itself will typically
not seek to limit or maintain control over the identity or
actions of its shareholders. Private companies, by contrast,
tend to maintain tight control over their shareholder base,
often through restrictions contained in a shareholders’
agreement.124

ii. Continuous Stock Prices
Public companies typically seek to maintain a highly liquid
trading market for their stock.125 This allows them to access
the widest possible shareholder base, and therefore to achieve
the lowest cost of capital. It also enables them to reconcile the
interests of shareholders with different time horizons. In turn,
liquidity requires that the stock be continually tradable, and
that the pricing be publicly available. Continuous stock prices

123
124
125

de Fontenay, supra note 6.
See Rauterberg, supra note 12, at 1126–27.
See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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are therefore a defining feature of public companies, even
though they are not required by rule or regulation.126
Yet private companies face significant restrictions on the
trading of their securities. Other than the very largest private
companies (referred to as “unicorns”), private companies
typically do not enjoy meaningful secondary trading of their
stock.127 Valuations of the firm (and therefore of its stock) only
tend to occur when the firm accepts new financing or when the
company is acquired.128 For this reason, it is usually inapt
even to refer to the “stock price” of a private company.

iii. Informationally Rich Environment
The active secondary market for public companies’ stock
reflects extensive and continually updated information. In
addition to the disclosure required of public companies under
the securities laws, information is also generated and rapidly
disseminated through the continuous stock prices discussed
above,129 as well as the combination of stock analyst reports,
media coverage, and publicly available data sets that have
developed around public companies and publicly-traded stock.
Most importantly, the combination of continuous stock
prices and copious, widely available information ensures that
the market for publicly-traded stock is a relatively efficient
126 RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 448
(12th ed. 2017) (demonstrating that shareholders with diverse time
horizons will want corporate managers to maximize the firm’s current stock
price, assuming that the stock trades in a liquid and informationally
efficient market).
127 See COX ET AL., supra note 105, at 276–77 (noting the many
restrictions typically placed on the trading of privately issued securities).
128 See David F. Larcker et al., Cashing It In: Private-Company
Exchanges and Employee Stock Sale Prior to IPO, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REGUL. (Oct. 9, 2018) (“[E]mployees who sell equity
awards in private-company securities that are not registered with the SEC
might not get a ‘fair’ price for their investment, based on previous funding
valuations or what they would get through an IPO or acquisition.”); see also
Elizabeth Pollman, Information Issues on Wall Street 2.0, 161 U. PA. L. REV.
179, 203, 209 (2012) (noting that the market for private company stock
remains largely illiquid).
129 See supra Section IV.A.2.b.
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one—by which we mean that stock prices rapidly incorporate
material information, due to the trading of informed market
participants, and change accordingly.130 Market efficiency in
turn affects the governance and ownership characteristics of
public companies in a number of ways, such as by allowing for
purely passive investors like index funds.
The information environment for private companies is
strikingly different. As discussed, private companies may
forgo virtually all disclosure regarding their operations,
governance, and financial condition to the public and
regulators, and may even refrain from disclosing much to
some or many of their own shareholders, unless the latter
specifically contract for disclosure rights.131 Among other
things, this poses significant valuation and monitoring
challenges for private companies, whose ownership is largely
limited to insiders and active shareholders with large stakes
in the firm.132

iv. Aggregate Litigation
A final explanation for why public and private companies
differ in their governance and behavior has to do with the
amount and types of litigation that each face, respectively.
Public companies are frequent targets of aggregate litigation,
including shareholder claims in the form of class action
lawsuits under the federal securities laws or state corporate
law.133 This is so for several reasons. First, the

130 See de Fontenay, supra note 6, at 485 (“At a minimum, there is
overwhelming evidence that stock prices on the major exchanges change
virtually instantaneously in response to salient new investment
information.”).
131 Supra note 119 and accompanying text.
132 See Thomas J. Chemmanur & Paolo Fulghieri, A Theory of the
Going-Public Decision, 12 REV. FIN. STUDS. 249, 250 (1999) (“In the case of
public firms, the required capital is generated (in general) by selling shares
to a large number of investors, whereas with private firms, much of the
external financing is provided by one large investor (often a venture
capitalist) or a small group of large investors (‘angels’).”).
133 See Emily Strauss, Is Everything Securities Fraud? 3 (Duke L. Sch.
Pub. L. & Legal Theory Series, Working Paper No. 2021-04, 2021),
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informationally rich environment of public companies does
much of the legwork for plaintiffs’ lawyers: they can generally
expect to learn of misconduct within the company (and the
surrounding details) in due course, or they can pour over a
company’s securities filings to find discrepancies between the
company’s voluminous disclosures and subsequent events,
regardless of whether there is any harm to the company’s
shareholders.134 Second, the relatively efficient market for
publicly-traded securities eases the task of proving damages.
If a company experiences an abnormally large stock price
decline following the announcement of corporate misconduct
or the correction of a prior misstatement, for example, the
plaintiffs can simultaneously use it as evidence of both
causation and amount of damages.135 Third, plaintiffs are not
required to prove reliance on a company’s misconduct or
misstatement if the stock is deemed to trade in an efficient
market, under the “fraud-on-the-market” doctrine.136 Finally,
the large and dispersed shareholder base of most public
companies137 makes for a ready class of plaintiffs: Individual
shareholders with small holdings have no reputation to
protect from sanction by firms.
In private companies, by contrast, shareholders may not
learn of corporate misconduct or potential fiduciary duty
breaches until there is nothing left for plaintiffs to recover.138
Obtaining the information necessary to bring a claim and
prove damages can be an exceptionally difficult task. More
importantly, perhaps, private-company shareholders tend to
be insiders or large stockholders, as we have seen, such that
they actively participate in the firm’s governance and are
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3664132 (on file with the Columbia Business
Law Review).
134 Id. at 3–4.
135 Jill E. Fisch, Jonah B. Gelbach & Jonathan Klick, The Logic and
Limits of Event Studies in Securities Fraud Litigation, 96 TEX. L. REV. 553,
562 (2018).
136 John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Fraud-on-theMarket Tort, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1755, 1759 (2013).
137 de Fontenay, supra note 6.
138 Pollman, supra note 28, at 390.
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therefore less likely to sue. Even where they are otherwise
inclined to sue, large stockholders may be dissuaded from
doing so out of concern for their reputation or their
relationship with the company.139

3. Unbundling the Public/Private Divide
It is worth noting that while the public and private
markets ecologies differ along a host of dimensions, the border
between them has also become increasingly blurry in recent
years. In a sense, capital markets have seen the “unbundling”
of the package of traits associated with public and private
markets. The paradigmatic public company, for instance,
bundles together centralized management, an independent
board, extensive disclosure, dispersed share ownership by
passive investors, and so forth.140 In contrast, the
paradigmatic large private company bundles together
shareholder control, ownership by a small number of insiders
and active shareholders, a thin information environment, and
an illiquid secondary market.141
Yet these two paradigms have become increasingly
disaggregated in recent years. As a result of (i) continued
deregulation of private capital raising and of trading in
private securities, (ii) increased competition among private
funds, and (iii) the relative scarcity of high-return
opportunities in today’s low-interest-rate environment, we
increasingly see characteristics of private markets entering
the public markets, and vice versa.142
Consider first governance devices associated with private
markets that have migrated to public markets. First,
corporate founders and insiders increasingly succeed in
retaining control of public companies, through strategies such
as adopting dual class stock structures in connection with an
139 David Rosenberg, The Two “Cycles” of Venture Capital, 28 J. CORP.
L. 419, 421 (2003) (discussing how reputation explains the absence of
litigation in the venture capital industry).
140 de Fontenay, supra note 6.
141 Id.
142 See id.
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IPO.143 Dual class public companies behave very differently
from the classic public company paradigm in which a widely
dispersed set of passive shareholders leaves management
effectively in control of the firm.144 Second, private investment
funds that have historically been confined to private markets
are operating in public markets to a greater degree. Private
equity leveraged buyout funds, for example, now make
minority investments in public companies through PIPE
transactions.145 Further, where they retain stakes in public
companies, either through PIPEs or following the IPO of one
of their portfolio companies, they increasingly seek to impose
private company governance devices, such as shareholders’
agreements.146 Third, the surge in popularity of SPACs
suggests strong appetite among large funds and institutional
investors for a form of publicly-traded private equity.147 More
generally, both SPACs and direct listings reveal private
companies’ desire to go public other than through the
traditional channel of an underwritten initial public offering.
In the other direction, public market features are
appearing in private markets. First, some of the largest
private companies now allow their stock to be traded in
secondary markets, even in the absence of ongoing

143 Jill E. Fisch & Steven Davidoff Solomon, The Problem of Sunsets, 99
B.U. L. REV. 1069–70 (2019).
144 Id. at 1065.
145 See Frequently Asked Questions About PIPEs, MORRISON &
FOERSTER,
https://media2.mofo.com/documents/faqspipes.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JQC3-ZFX4] (last visited Oct. 17, 2021) (defining PIPE
transactions and detailing the increase in such transactions); Ari B. Blaut
et al, Market Trends 2020/21: PIPEs, LEXIS PRACTICAL GUIDANCE (May 18,
2021),
https://www.sullcrom.com/files/upload/Market-Trends2020_21_%20PIPEs.pdf [https://perma.cc/ENB9-E44C] (detailing 59%
increase in number of PIPE deals from 2019 to 2020 and an 110% increase
in total volume of deals).
146 See Rauterberg, supra note 12, at 1129–1130.
147 See Michael Klausner, Michael Ohlrogge & Emily Ruan, A Sober
Look at SPACs 13, 18 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Fin. Working Paper No.
746/2021,
2021),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3720919 (on file with
the Columbia Business Law Review) (discussing popularity of SPACs).
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disclosure.148 Second, some mutual funds have begun
investing a small portion of their assets in mature venturebacked private companies with high valuations.149 This is
notable because mutual funds are open to retail investors and
have therefore traditionally invested exclusively in public
markets. In addition, attempts have been made to create
diversified portfolios of private company stocks, though the
possibility of indexing appears to be a long way off.150
Each of these developments puts pressure on the
regulatory divide between public and private companies and
warrants a careful restatement of the goals motivating the
public/private divide and a clear-eyed assessment of whether
such goals are being achieved. As we will see, however, the
functional complexity of the public/private divide translates
into considerable normative complexity too, when the task
turns to assessing the divide and considering regulatory
changes.151

B. Capital Raising and Issuer Choice
Several years ago, Donald Langevoort, perhaps the leading
theorist of the public/private divide, suggested that “the most
conceptually interesting subject in securities law” was the
question whether it was “possible—indeed desirable—that a
large segment of economically important firms in the
American economy stay private, perhaps indefinitely, yet with

148 See Elizabeth Pollman, Information Issues on Wall Street 2.0, 161
U. Pa. L. Rev. 179, 193–199 (2012).
149 Jeff Schwartz, Should Mutual Funds Invest in Startups? A Case
Study of Fidelity Magellan Fund’s Investments in Unicorns (and Other
Startups) and the Regulatory Implications, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1341, 1348–50,
1359–60 (2017).
150 See,
e.g., THE PRIVATE SHARES FUND, PROSPECTUS (2021),
https://privatesharesfund.com/downloads/prospectus/
[https://perma.cc/9YD2-DE74]
151 For an important example of re-thinking the basic framework of the
public/private divide from the vantagepoint of the securities laws, see
Guttentag, supra note 22.
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easy access to large amounts of capital?”152 In essence,
Langevoort was suggesting that capital markets in the United
States had or would soon come to sustain a state of affairs in
which successful, growing private firms could access sufficient
capital while operating as public or private companies.
Empirical research since then suggests that we have
indeed arrived at this state of affairs, and that private
companies now enjoy an issuer choice regime—an
environment in which a successful large firm can successfully
operate in public or private markets, making the choice
between them truly optional.153 As a result, private companies
decide to go public only if—and only when—it is privately
desirable for them to do so, based on their own balancing of
the costs and benefits of being a public company.
A major cause of this state of affairs was the growth in the
availability of capital in private markets, where capital
raising now far outstrips public markets.
Second, and relatedly, the increasing availability of private
capital seems to have lessened companies’ desire to go or
remain public.154 Several factors, including the removal of
various state-level restrictions on private issuers’ securities
offerings, led to increases in the supply of private capital.155
This increased supply, in turn, enables late-stage private
firms to grow to a size, levels of employment, and levels of
revenue, which few private firms could previously obtain.156
The product of this issuer choice regime is that fewer highly152 Donald Langevoort, The Regulation of Primary Markets, in
SECURITIES MARKET ISSUES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 16, at 122.
153 Ewens & Farre-Mensa, supra note 5, at 5467–68. See, e.g., Romano,
supra note 26 (advocating for more issuer and investor choice in securities
regulation); John C. Coates IV, Private vs. Political Choice of Securities
Regulation: A Political Cost/Benefit Analysis, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 531, 543–49
(2001) (noting that certain key features of the securities regulatory regime
are subject to issuer choice).
154 See de Fontenay, supra note 6 (arguing that the deregulation of
private capital raising over the last few decades has contributed
significantly to the decline in U.S. public companies); Ewens & FarreMensa, supra note 5, at 5467.
155 Id. at 5467
156 Id. at 5468.
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valued private firms choose to go or remain public—thus the
observed decline in the share of public companies.157 The
remaining universe of public companies is smaller and older.
In sum, the growth of private capital led to an issuer choice
environment for firms because private market financing was
a viable substitute for public markets financing; in this “new
equilibrium,” fewer and older firms go public.158

C. Firms Now Face Complex, Idiosyncratic Tradeoffs
in Determining Whether to Be Public or Private
In this Section, we argue that the tradeoffs that private
firms face in determining whether to go public (or that public
firms face in contemplating going private) have become
increasingly firm-specific and idiosyncratic. This is partly due
to the diminishing importance of capital raising as the leading
attraction of going public. Private firms can now raise
enormous sums, funding growth that previously would have
been possible only for public companies.159 As importantly,
however, successful private firms differ considerably along the
other dimensions that empirical research suggests are
important to firms’ going public decisions.
The going-public versus staying-private tradeoff facing
firms becomes profoundly firm-specific because the principal
attractions of being public are now many, distinct, and apply
to firms heterogeneously. What may be a core attraction of
going public for one large and successful private firm may be
insignificant to another successful, growing private company.
For instance, a prominent survey of CFOs suggests that
the most common reasons for firms to go public are to (1)
create public stock for use in acquisitions, (2) establish a

157 See de Fontenay, supra note 6 (arguing that the deregulation of
private capital raising over the last few decades has contributed
significantly to the decline in U.S. public companies); Ewens & FarreMensa, supra note 5, at 5467.
158 Id. at 5467, 5498, 5506.
159 Id. at 5466; BAUGUESS ET AL., supra note 7.
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market stock price, and (3) enhance a firm’s reputation.160
Other commonly cited reasons for going public include
allowing major pre-IPO investors to liquidate part or all of
their ownership position.161 To motivate the idea that firms
face idiosyncratic tradeoffs because the determinants of
decisions to go public (or private) apply heterogeneously to
them, consider a few illustrations.
While it may be surprising that a leading attraction of
going public is creating an acquisition currency, evidence
suggests that newly public firms are, on average, aggressive
acquirers.162 IPOs are more common in industries with a high
degree of M&A, but newly public firms also conduct far more
acquisitions than private companies of similar size and
maturity.163 For instance, research in financial economics
documents both that newly public firms are prolific acquirers
and that the torrid pace of post-IPO firm acquisitions is due
in part to the industries in which those firms are
concentrated.164
Conversely, Ewens and Farre-Mensa explore why firms
choose to remain private.165 They investigate a preference
among founders for control, studying whether the size of
founders’ initial equity stake influences firms’ later decisions

160 James
C.
Brau
&
Stanley
E.
Fawcett, Initial Public Offerings: An Analysis of Theory and Practice,
61
J. FIN. 399, 407 tbl.II (2006). As an example of how reputation’s importance
may differ among firms, firms that make consumer-facing products would
arguably benefit more from the additional publicity of being a public
company than a firm that makes intermediate products in a supply chain.
161 Id.; MAUBOUSSIN & CALLAHAN, supra note 2, at 4.
162 See Ugur Celikyurt, Merih Sevilir & Anil Shivdasani, Going Public
to Acquire? The Acquisition Motive in IPOs, 96 J. FIN. ECON. 345, 346 (2010).
163 Id.
164 Id. at 351 (“[A] substantial portion of the M&A activity of IPO firms
is due to industry-level M&A activity, perhaps because firms go public to
exploit industry-level M&A opportunities.”).
165 Ewens & Farre-Mensa, supra note 5, at 5498–500; see also Brau &
Fawcett, supra note 160, at 401 (separately researching why firms choose
to remain private).
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to go public.166 Ewens and Farre-Mensa suggest that as
founder control increases, founders use that control to delay
or prevent startups’ exit to public markets.167 As part of this,
they buttress the central point for our argument, which is that
the size of founders’ initial control stakes differs considerably
across late-stage startups.168
In a vein that cleaves closer to the original design of the
federal securities laws, recent empirical evidence suggests
that increasing the disclosure obligations imposed on private
companies increases their propensity to go public.169 In 2007,
Congress passed the Food and Drug Administration
Amendments Act (FDAAA).170 The FDAAA requires all
biopharmaceutical companies, whether private or public, to
publicly disclose material information, including results, of all
clinical trials in Phase II or further.171 Yet, the FDAAA does
not simply automatically induce firms that are subject to it to
go public, nor does it mechanically and uniformly increase the
likelihood of subject firms going public. Instead, well-designed
research exploring its effects finds that the FDAAA increases
the propensity of subject firms to go public in distinctively
asymmetric ways. Firms with an extensive drug development
portfolio were significantly affected by the law and were much
more likely to go public, and firms obviously differ
significantly in this respect.172

166 Ewens & Farre-Mensa, supra note 5, at 5498–500; see also Brau &
Fawcett, supra note 160, at 403 tbl.I, 422, 423 tbl.VIII, 424. Founders’ initial
equity stakes are obviously endogenous, but Ewens and Farre-Mensa
employ a plausible instrumental variables approach based on exogeneous
variation in the supply of financing to address this issue. Ewens & FarreMensa, supra note 5, at 5498–500.
167 Id. at 5502.
168 Id. at 5494 fig.7, 5498–5502.
169 Cyrus Aghamolla & Richard T. Thakor, Do Mandatory Disclosure
Requirements for Private Firms Increase the Propensity of Going Public?, J.
ACCT. RSCH., July 2021, at 4–5.
170 Pub. L. 100-85, 121 Stat. 823 (2007)
171 Id. (codified in 42 U.S.C. § 282(j)(2)(A)) Aghamolla & Thakor, supra
note 169, at 3 (discussing details of law).
172 Aghamolla & Thakor, supra note 169, at 4.
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V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW
PUBLIC/PRIVATE EQUILIBRIUM
We have argued that two sets of developments in capital
markets have undermined the coherency of the concept of
public companies. One development has been the increasing
complexity of the public and private market ecologies. The
securities laws established important differences for public
and private issuers, but alongside those necessitated by law,
public and private markets now differ along a host of other
important dimensions as well. A second development has been
the growth of private capital markets, which has led to an
issuer choice regime in which successful private firms can
remain private indefinitely. A significant result of these
changes is that firms now face a more complex calculus
between going public and staying private that differs
considerably from the tradeoff originally contemplated by the
securities laws.173
This is a descriptive picture, but it has implications for
policy too. One implication of these changes for securities law
is that the category of public companies makes relatively less
sense. The reason for this lies in the issuer choice regime in
which firms’ decisions regarding whether to be public or
private are driven by varied and different considerations. This
change matters to securities regulation because its core rules
impose mandatory regulations on public companies.
Consider the following way to rationalize the mandatory
regulation of public companies. Defenders of the mandatory
disclosure system imposed on public companies have
sometimes argued that it mitigates the under-production of
socially useful information by firms.174 The logic runs thus:

See infra Section IV.C.
See Fox, Issuer Choice, supra note 26, at 568–71, 585–90. Other
defenders of mandatory disclosure have focused on how it mitigates a
specific set of market failures involving firms with dispersed ownership.
This is a seemingly plausible way to rationalize the operating company
divide whose triggers turn on the number of shareholders of record or on
offering securities to the general public. For a powerful defense of
mandatory disclosure along functional lines, see Guttentag, supra note 22;
173
174
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Many parties benefit from the information revealed by firms
through public disclosure, including that firm’s investors,
customers, suppliers, and competitors. Yet the firm itself only
internalizes some of these benefits from the information it
discloses. Thus, firms will under-produce information from a
social perspective, if left to their own devices. The magnitude
of these spillovers also might be thought to roughly track the
size of a firm. Thus, a distinct regime of regulation should
apply to large firms. This argument rationalizes the distinct
treatment of “private” and “public” firms.175
But the changes in capital markets that we sketch weaken
the appeal of this view of the public/private divide. Why?
Because as the reasons for going and staying public fragment,
it becomes less likely that the underlying market failure
targeted by the mandatory treatment is correlated with a firm
being public. Returning to the previous paragraph, it becomes
less likely that firms that produce important informational
spillovers will happen to be public, rather than private. Of
course, an issuer choice regime does not completely
undermine the logic of the mandatory interventions imposed
on a specific set of public companies. Public companies, on
average, remain much older, larger, and more profitable than
private companies. Our point is simply that an issuer choice
regime, in which issuer choices are motivated by many and
different factors, means that the firms that ultimately choose
to become public are likely to have less in common.
As a result, if we want to continue to impose mandatory
rules on public companies, it is worth reconsidering the
triggers for when companies cross the public/private divide.
Under the status quo—where the fundamental triggers for
being public have given rise to an issuer choice regime, and
where issuers’ choices are driven by complex and
heterogeneous features of public and private markets—the
case for mandatory regulation of public companies has
weakened. If the public/private tradeoff has become
Michael D. Guttentag, Accuracy Enhancement, Agency Costs, and
Disclosure Regulation, 3 REV. L. & ECON. 611, 625–27 (2007).
175 John C. Coffee, Jr. provided a powerful early defense of the United
States’ mandatory disclosure regime. Coffee, supra note 26.
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profoundly idiosyncratic, then it makes mandatory regulation
that turns on the current public/private divide less likely to be
apt and less likely to be appropriately tailored to a market
failure associated with that divide. It is worth emphasizing
that we do not think this problem is fatal to the basic vision of
public markets as subject to mandatory regulation, nor do we
necessarily favor eliminating the mandatory regulation
imposed on public markets.
But for these reasons we do conclude that the
public/private divide in securities regulation is overdue for a
fundamental reexamination. This rethinking must address
not simply where to draw the line between public and private
companies, but also whether to draw a line at all—and if so,
on what basis—and how to regulate firms on each side of the
divide. Crucially, these questions must be answered
simultaneously—rather than serially as they often have been
over the last several decades—considering the unavoidable
connections between securities regulation and firms’
governance, capital structure, trading environment, and
information environment. Viewed in that light, the task faced
by Congress and the SEC in reassessing the public/private
divide is even more difficult than we imagined.

VI. CONCLUSION
How the public/private divide works shapes the success of
how we regulate public and private companies. While the
original architecture of the divide was designed by securities
law, two rich ecologies have developed around that legal
design that cause public and private markets to differ along a
host of dimensions. The broad availability of capital in private
markets has created an issuer choice regime in which firms’
decisions regarding whether to be public or private are
influenced in idiosyncratic ways by different aspects of these
ecologies. The normative implication of these changes is to
reduce the coherency of the regulation of public and private
markets.

